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ABSTRACT
________________________________________________________________
The archaeological response to the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq is
often portrayed as a crusade to rescue antiquities, destroyed either directly
by the military action itself or indirectly by the looting of archaeological sites
and museums. I argue in this paper that this narrative is awfully inadequate,
and masks the ethical and political dimensions at the core of this historical
episode. I contend that, in their often well-intended attempts to rescue
antiquities, most archaeologists involved have projected a professionalized,
apolitical and abstract response, devoid of the social and political context,
and based on the fetishisation of a narrowly and problematically defined
archaeological record. I argue further that the increasing collaboration of
many archaeologists with the invading militaries and occupation authorities
since 2003, assisted by the ‘‘cultural turn’’ especially within the US military,
have laid the foundations for an emerging military-archaeology complex. I
trace the contours of this phenomenon by examining various archaeological
and museum discourses and practices. This new development (with historical
resonances that go as far back as the 18th century, if not earlier) is linked
directly with the ontology and epistemology of archaeology, and deserves
further close scrutiny and analysis. The thesis advanced here does not
advocate inaction and withdrawal in situations of warfare, but a critical
engagement that safeguards the autonomy of the scholar; critiques the
political agendas and power structures of contemporary warfare;
deconstructs its discursive basis and its ideological overtones; and shows its
catastrophic consequences for people and things alike, past and present.
________________________________________________________________
Re´sume´: La re´ponse arche´ologique a` l’invasion de 2003 et a` l’occupation de
l’Irak est souvent de´peinte comme une croisade pour sauver les antiquite´s
de´truitent soit directement par l’action militaire, soit indirectement par le
pillage des sites arche´ologiques et des muse´es. Je de´montre dans cet article
que cette pre´sentation des faits est totalement errone´e et masque les
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dimensions e´thiques et politiques au cœur de cet e´pisode historique. Je
soutiens que dans leurs tentatives souvent bien intentionne´es destine´es a`
sauver des antiquite´s, la plupart des arche´ologues implique´s ont projete´
une re´ponse professionnalise´e, apolitique et abstraite, ignorante du
contexte social et politique et base´e sur la fe´tichisation d’un compte-rendu
arche´ologique de´fini de fac¸on e´troit et proble´matique. Je de´montre
e´galement que la collaboration qui s’est e´tendue a` de nombreux
arche´ologues en relation avec les forces militaires d’invasion depuis 2003,
assiste´ par la mise en place d’un «tournant culturel» tout particulie`rement
dans l’arme´e ame´ricaine, a jete´ les bases d’un complexe d’arche´ologie
militaire e´mergent. Je de´finis les contours de ce phe´nome`ne en examinant
diffe´rents discours et pratiques a` la fois arche´ologiques et relatifs aux
muse´es. Ce nouveau de´veloppement (avec des re´sonances historiques qui
ont pris racine de`s le 18e sie`cle, sinon plus toˆt) est lie´ directement a`
l’ontologie et l’e´piste´mologie arche´ologique et me´rite une analyse et un
examen plus minutieux. La the`se avance´e ici ne pre´conise pas l’inaction et
la re´tractation dans les situations de guerre mais un engagement critique
qui sauvegarde l’autonomie du spe´cialiste; des critiques sur les ordres du
jour politiques et les structures du pouvoir de toute guerre contemporaine;
la de´construction de sa base discursive et de ses connotations ide´ologiques;
et montre en dernier ressort ses conse´quences catastrophiques, passe´es et
pre´sentes, a` fois pour les habitants et les objets.
________________________________________________________________
Resumen: La respuesta arqueolo´gica a la invasio´n y ocupacio´n de Irak se
representa muchas veces como una cruzada para rescatar las antigu¨edades,
que resultaron destruidas bien por la propia accio´n militar o indirectamente
por el saqueo de los yacimientos arqueolo´gicos o museos. En este trabajo
argumento que esta argumentacio´n es terriblemente inadecuada y oculta las
dimensiones e´ticas y polı´ticas subyacentes en este acontecimiento histo´rico.
Afirmo que, en sus intentos bienintencionados de rescatar las antigu¨edades,
la mayorı´a de los arqueo´logos participantes han proyectado una respuesta
abstracta, apolı´tica y profesionalizada, exenta del contexto social y polı´tico, y
basada en convertir en fetiche un registro arqueolo´gico estrecha y
problema´ticamente definido. Tambie´n sostengo que la creciente colaboracio´n
de muchos arqueo´logos con los militares invasores y las autoridades de
ocupacio´n desde el 2003, ayudados por el «giro cultural» experimentado
principalmente en el seno del eje´rcito estadounidense, han sentado las bases
para la aparicio´n de un complejo militar y arqueolo´gico. Sigo el perfil de este
feno´meno analizando varios discursos y pra´cticas arqueolo´gicas y de los
museos. Este nuevo desarrollo (con resonancias histo´ricas que se remontan
hasta el siglo 18, si no antes) esta´ directamente relacionado con la ontologı´a y
epistemologı´a de la arqueologı´a y merece ma´s escrutinio y ana´lisis. La tesis
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avanzada aquı´ no aboga por la inaccio´n o la retirada en situaciones de guerra,
sino que se trata de un compromiso crı´tico que salvaguarda la autonomı´a del
acade´mico, critica los programas polı´ticos y las estructuras de poder de la
guerra moderna; desmantela su base argumental y sus tonos ideolo´gicos y
muestra sus catastro´ficas consecuencias, tanto para personas como para las
cosas, del pasado y del presente.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Introduction
During the fierce fighting of the past few weeks, we were relieved to see that
our military leaders and coalition partners took extreme precautions to avoid
targeting cultural sites along with other non-military places. It was also com-
forting to receive reports that our armed forces have conducted inspections
at some of the important archaeological sites….The return to freedom of the
Iraqi people must include the freedom to enjoy the great heritage resources
inherited from their ancestors….
In contrast to the inhuman Iraqi regime that has just ended, the United
States is a benevolent nation committed to the realization of the full human
potential through freedom, democracy, fair play and the rule of law (From a
letter sent on the 16th of April 2003 to President Bush by 21 US professional
organisations to do with heritage, from the American Anthropological Asso-
ciation, to the Society of American Archaeology, and many more).1
The Department of State should undertake increased responsibility for pro-
tection of cultural heritage worldwide…To protect tangible heritage, the Uni-
ted States needs to better understand the intangible cultural values of the
nation to be occupied (Wilkie 2008; Nancy Wilkie, ex-president of the Archae-
ological Institute of America, and member of the Cultural Property Advisory
Committee which advices the President of the USA on national policy
regarding import of archaeological artefacts; emphasis added).
These two passages set the chronological limits of my enquiry here. More
importantly, however, they are paradigmatic of a phenomenon that deserves
close scrutiny; they embody the monumental failure of most archaeologists
and other heritage professionals and organisations to articulate a political
and ethical response to the phenomenon known as the ‘‘war on terror’’, a
response that could go beyond a narrowly defined and misguided sense of
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‘‘professional duty’’.2 The first intervention, in the midst of the US-led Iraq
invasion, in its eagerness to highlight the need for the protection of cultural
heritage as defined by these organisations, adopted uncritically the rhetoric
of the invading and subsequently occupying power. It abrogated thus the
duty of the scholar and intellectual to subject to critique and scrutiny social
reality and power structures, especially since the Iraq invasion was opposed
to by the majority of people worldwide, and its imperial and neo-colonial
logic had been, even at that early stage, exposed widely. The second passage
demonstrates vividly the logical extension of such uncritical attitude. The
heritage professional here takes for granted that the course of invading and
occupying independent countries by the USA administration is already set;
she/he thus offers cultural advice on how such operation can be carried out.
Furthermore, the passage, unintentionally perhaps, suggests that cultural her-
itage worldwide and its protection should become part of the remit of the
USA Department of State, as if global imperial domination is a done deal.
Finally, it points to the need to understand the cultural values of the nations
‘‘to be occupied’’, echoing a phenomenon that has been termed by scholars
and critics as ‘‘the cultural turn’’ of the ‘‘war on terror’’: the recent tendency
of the USA military authorities (and their allies) to invest heavily on and
incorporate insights from the academy and especially from the Humanities,
which could help them understand local cultural attitudes and values, in
order to succeed in their invading and colonising projects, such as in Afghan-
istan and Iraq (cf. Gonza´lez 2007, 2008; Gregory 2008; Mirzoeff 2008).3
The history of archaeology is replete with examples of scholars operating
as part of military structures; archaeologists who followed the flag and
marched along with the invaders and colonisers, carrying out their schol-
arly work, no doubt for the good of scholarship, in the name of saving
antiquities in the ‘‘cradles of mankind’’ and within the broader ‘‘civilising’’
mission. In the past, military leaders doubled as archaeologists and excava-
tors, and recent commentators have drawn attention to the resemblances
between certain field archaeological practices and military operations (e.g.
Joyce 2002). But today we do not live in the era of Napoleonic Wars, not
even the era of post-Ottoman colonial Middle-East, where archaeologists
and colonial administrators worked hand-in-hand, often embodying both
roles in the same person. Or do we? Edward Said, in the preface to the
2003 edition of Orientalism noted: ‘‘Orientalism once again raises the ques-
tion of whether modern imperialism ever ended, or whether it has contin-
ued in the Orient since Napoleon’s entry into Egypt two centuries ago’’
(2003:xxi–xxii; cf. also El-Haj 2005; Gregory 2004). History has the annoy-
ing habit of repeating itself, only that, the second time, as someone
famously noted, it plays itself as farce, but with tragic consequences never-
theless. The recent, ‘‘pre-emptive wars’’ since 2001 show that Said’s
concern was valid. One would have expected, however, that the scholarly
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fields in the Humanities would have learned from the recent endless
debates on colonialism and post-colonialism, on the links between knowl-
edge and power, and on the necessity for reflexivity. Evidence shows other-
wise. In this article, I return to the issues I discussed first in a 2003 piece
(Hamilakis 2003). I examine the archaeological responses to the ‘‘war on
terror’’ and more specifically to the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the
USA and its allies, and trace recent developments since 2003. I argue that
what in 2003 I tentatively identified as the ‘‘embedded archaeologist’’, the
figure of the professional who works in close collaboration with the invad-
ing and occupying armies in the service of rescuing antiquities, is now a
common occurrence. Moreover, that the links between the military of these
invading and occupying powers and the archaeologists and heritage profes-
sionals, mostly from these same countries, are now both more widespread
and much closer than they were in 2003, producing de facto a military-
archaeology complex. I contend that the phenomenon poses serious ethical
and political challenges, and demands close scrutiny and scholarly interro-
gation.
The Iraq Invasion and the ‘‘Embedded Archaeologist’’
With regard to Iraq, the basic facts are by now more or less known.4 In
the run-up to the 2003 US-led illegal invasion and occupation of the coun-
try, archaeologists from the invading countries got mobilised, fearful that
the incoming war will destroy the antiquities of Iraq. Lists of sites and their
co-ordinates were sent to the Pentagon, and to the UK Ministry of
Defence, questions were asked in the UK House of Lords (Stone 2005), let-
ters were written to politicians, articles were published in newspapers, some
by archaeologists, and some by journalists based on archaeological sources.
So far so good, you would say. After all, these archaeologists were doing a
commendable job, raising their voices in favour of the protection of antiq-
uities. In other words, they were advocates of the archaeological past, espe-
cially since powerful collectors’ lobbies, especially in the USA, saw an
opportunity and lobbied the US administration for a ‘‘liberal’’ policy
regarding the antiquities of Iraq (e.g. MacLeod 2003; Global Policy Forum
2007).
The argument of many of these archaeologists was that, if they did not
interfere, ignorant military personnel and their political masters would
have destroyed valuable antiquities, of importance not only to the Iraqis,
but to the whole world, or they could have succumbed to the pressure of
collectors’ lobbies. Needless to say that we are not dealing here with a uni-
fied and homogeneous response. In this mobilisation, one could detect var-
ious and at times conflicting tendencies, from genuine concern, to national
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rivalry and the anxiety felt by various organisations, institutions and indi-
viduals that their nation should be represented in the effort of rescuing
antiquities and in the subsequent situation on the ground, and often a
mixture of both. Institutions from the invading countries that portray
themselves as ‘‘universal museums’’ (such as the British Museum) rushed
to head these initiatives, leading others to question their motives (cf. Stone
2005:7). Not all these specialists were against the invasion (Bahrani 2008a),
but those who were, may have been mobilised not only by their genuine
sense of professional duty and care for antiquities, but also by the belief
that in emphasising the potential danger to antiquities, they were express-
ing a veiled anti-war feeling, founded on their professional expertise. In
most cases, however, these responses were articulated and were perceived
as action by a professional group being mobilised through whatever means
possible, in order to save antiquities. Only that the issue was and still is
much more complicated than that, and it is this complexity and the associ-
ated ethical conundrums that I want to bring into focus here.
For a start, most of these interventions were happening within a specific
historical and political context: a war that was widely perceived as being
illegal, a pre-emptive strike, based on the sidelining of the only legitimate
global body, the UN, and on evidence that most people and organisations
even then considered, as it turned out, rightly, fabricated. The ideological
justification of such venture was the well-known neo-conservative, neo-
imperial project, which championed USA unilateral military interventions
anywhere in the world. The pretext was to protect the USA from the
‘‘unknown unknowns’’ and the metaphysically perceived sense of ‘‘terror’’.
But the subtext was to appropriate world resources, and remake regions
such as the Middle East along the lines of neo-liberal economy, as it
became increasingly clear. Indeed, this was commented upon widely in the
media by critics and intellectuals, and was also opposed by the majority of
people on earth, who in 2003 were in the streets, demonstrating by the
millions.
Archaeology is all about context, we say to our first year students. Yet,
our colleagues, with some exceptions, seemed to have (or have chosen to)
ignored this context. There was perhaps a desire to demonstrate complete
neutrality; perhaps many believed that heritage specialists can be, as profes-
sionals, completely apolitical, or they thought that in this way their inter-
vention can be more effective. Also, many archaeologists and other heritage
professionals may have thought that they can decouple the policies of their
governments from their own attempts to rescue antiquities, or even that
they may be able to atone for some of these policies by attempting to pre-
serve some of the antiquities of the invading country. Yet, all social action
is situated within specific regimes of power. To ignore the context of such
interventions and treat the efforts to rescue antiquities as an abstract act,
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antiquities that appeared as endangered by an equally abstract threat of
‘‘war’’ (as if it was a ‘‘natural’’ disaster), leads at best to the de-politicisa-
tion of warfare and its agents, and at worse, as in the passages above, to
the adoption of the rhetoric of the invader and coloniser.
Second, on what basis can someone decide which sites are archaeologi-
cally significant, to be listed for preservation? What are the criteria?
Significant for whom? For some specific Anglo-American or western
archaeologists, for some Iraqi archaeologists, the people of Iraq? And which
social groups within it? The ‘‘globe’’ as a whole? Was this process of valua-
tion based on any historical, ethnographic or other research? Archaeology
no longer makes the distinction between past and present material culture,
or even between artefacts and other material traces, be it landscapes, city-
scapes, or seascapes. All material culture is the concern of archaeology. All
types of human-scapes and landscapes are socially important for the pres-
ent as well as the future, and different groups are attached to different
kinds of material culture. Certain western, often orientalist discourses have
declared aspects of Middle Eastern prehistory as ‘‘evolutionary firsts’’ and
the region as a whole the ‘‘cradle of the western civilisation’’, which has
been symbolically appropriated as ‘‘global past’’ (cf. several papers in Pol-
lock and Bernbeck 2005). Some non-‘‘Mesopotamian’’ sites were included
in the lists supplied to the military by archaeologists,5 but what about the
innumerable, non ‘‘important’’ material traces of human life in Iraq, past
and present? The absurdity in this operation is the process of selective listing
itself, carried out by archaeologists for the military of their own countries,
about to start bombing. Let’s hear the Iraqi-born, archaeologist and art his-
torian, Zainab Bahrani on this: ‘‘The entirety of Iraq is a world cultural
heritage site, and there is no way that a strategic bombing can avoid some-
thing archaeological’’.6
Third, and following on from the above, how can these specialists have
claimed that they were rescuing antiquities by supplying these lists, when it
was announced before hand that this will be a war of ‘‘shock and awe’’?
Here are some facts testifying to the ferocity of the invasion:
During the 1991 Gulf War, roughly three hundred Tomahawk cruise missiles
were fired over the course of five weeks. In 2003, more than three hundred
and eighty were launched in a single day. Between March 20 and May 2, the
weeks of ‘‘major combat’’, the US military dropped more than thirty thousand
bombs on Iraq, as well as twenty thousand precision-cruised missiles––67 per-
cent of the total number ever made (Klein 2007:331–332; emphasis added).
Even if certain ‘‘archaeological sites’’ were to be spared in this relentless
bombing, how about all the other material traces of human life, past and
present, how about the human lives themselves?
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But these interventions by archaeologists prior to and in the midst of
the invasion is not the whole story. A number of specialists went much
further: they accepted advisory roles within the Pentagon, the British Minis-
try of Defence, or the occupation authorities, advising on archaeological
and heritage matters, and stressing the importance of material heritage. In
2 February 2003, well before the start of the invasion, Peter Stone, then
chief executive officer of the World Archaeological Congress, was
approached by the UK Ministry of Defence and was asked to act as advi-
sor. He accepted, and started providing expertise on material heritage, liais-
ing with Mesopotamian specialists, participating in various meetings, and
even writing an article on the importance of antiquities which was pub-
lished in Arabic in the newspaper put out by the British in the occupied
sector under their responsibility. Although he was not asked to sign a bid-
ding confidentially agreement, he had to work, at least in the early stages,
in secrecy (Stone 2005:3). Here is the farcical element in the whole affair:
these specialists were offering advice on cultural heritage to the military of
their own countries, while at the same time they were embedded within
structures which were destroying that material heritage daily, with a force
rarely seen in previous military conflicts. A revealing indication of how
these heritage specialists were able to construe their role in strict, ‘‘profes-
sional’’ terms, making themselves immune to the dealings in the ‘‘office
next door’’ to them, is the following passage:
I decided that if the MoD––understandably as they were in the midst of run-
ning a war––did not have the time to brief archaeologists about pre- (or
post-) war planning, I would take the initiative and contact a number of
people from whom I wanted advice in anticipation of this meeting (Stone
2005:4; emphasis added).
We are all aware of the destruction that followed: the looting of the Iraq
Museum in Baghdad and of the National library, the looting and destruc-
tion of hundreds of declared archaeological sites all over the country, the
use of the site of Babylon as well as other sites (e.g. Kish, Ur, Samarra) as
military bases, resulting in significant damage (Al-Hussainy and Matthews
2008; Bahrani 2006; Curtis 2008). And of course, all this in the context of
a far wider humanitarian, cultural and environmental catastrophe, in the
context of immense brutality, terror and torture, in the context of Abu
Ghraib and the other torture facilities all over Iraq. Does the estimated 1.2
million civilian deaths since March 2003,7 more than those who died in
the Rwanda genocide, and the four million displaced,8 not constitute a
huge destruction of Iraqi heritage?
Many archaeologists and others expressed outraged at the images of the
looted Museum, much fewer expressed similar outrage at the broader war
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crimes committed. Many specialists expressed despair, and accepted failure,
that even with all the warnings and the pleading to the invading and occu-
pying armies, all the collaboration and offers of advice, such ‘‘archaeological
disaster’’ could have happened. The Iraq Museum was second in the list of
eighty buildings to be secured by the US army. It made no difference. But
what was perhaps not evident to many of us then, but it is now, is that the
indifference shown by the invaders to looting and to destruction was not
unrelated to the broader USA administration’s plan to undo a whole coun-
try so that it can build it a-new as a corporate utopia, as a fully privatised
paradise for Halliburton. After all, this neo-imperial project did not believe
in anything public, be it museums, archaeological sites, or the oil industry
(Klein 2007). That is why it did not matter that much to them if the antiq-
uities of Iraq were to end up in private collections in the USA, UK, or
Japan. It is this mentality and climate that the US collectors’ lobbies had
sensed and they had tried to capitalise on by advocating the ‘‘legitimate dis-
persal of cultural material through the market’’ which, they claimed, is the
best way to guarantee its preservation (Global Policy Forum 2007:2).
In the most recent, published assessment of the state of antiquities in
Iraq, authored by Abbas Al-Hussainy, ex-director of the State Board of
Antiquities and Heritage (2006–2007), and the Mesopotamian specialist
Roger Matthews, the conclusions are grim, but the responsibility clear:
In conclusion, we can state that the archaeological and cultural heritage(s) of
Iraq are in the most severe state of crisis that they have ever experienced.
Until the mid-nineteenth century AD the physical remains of Iraq’s uniquely
significant past lay more or less safe and untouched in the earth, where they
were rudely disturbed by western explorers from the 1840s onwards. Events
in the five years since spring 2003 have been even more disastrous for the
integrity, or even survival, of large portions of the archaeological and histori-
cal heritage of Iraq and, sadly, much of the blame for that disaster has to be
laid at the door of the governments of the invading states who failed to take
seriously enough the threat to Iraq’s heritage that would inevitably accom-
pany a collapse of central government in Iraq (Al-Hussainy and Matthews
2008:98–99).
In the same article, Al-Hussainy also recounts a strange event, which
evokes very vividly the life and work of a ‘‘native’’ archaeologist in a coun-
try under military occupation by the US and its allies:
On the 24th of May 2007 an American military convoy arrived at my office
at the Iraq Museum and demanded to enter the compound. When I refused
they broke down the gates, and when I again refused to allow them into the
building itself they gave me a strange letter in Arabic, addressed to ‘Dear
Colleague’ and lacking a signature, which stated that their group belonged to
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the US Embassy in Baghdad, and that they were authorised to enter the
museum. When I responded that this letter was insufficient they replied that
they would enter the building whether or not I agreed. At this point I threa-
tened to call UNESCO to say that this group wanted to destroy the Iraq
Museum again, at which point they disappeared. I never received any expla-
nation of their behaviour, let alone an apology (Al-Hussainy and Matthews
2008:96).
Finally, the same authors refute arguments that the looting of antiquities
was due to poverty, claiming that:
…rural communities living in proximity to archaeological sites regarded, still
regard, those sites not as potential sources of financial wealth, but rather as
sacred, spiritual places, connected either with evil jinn (genies), or with cem-
eteries for the burial of their own dead (Al-Hussainy and Matthews 2008:98).
It seems that the widespread looting of archaeological sites and artefacts,
was due not only to the destruction of cultural infrastructure of Iraq as a
result of the invasion (and the sanctions before it) but also of the incorpo-
ration of the country in the networks of global neo-liberal economy and its
art market, and the creation of channels through which such a flow could
be facilitated. As Robert Fisk has stated,
The instruments on how to cherry pick Mesopotamia’s most precious heri-
tage did not come from a 13th-century warrior or from hordes riding from
the east. They came from billionaires, by email and coded fax, from around
the globe. Greed has been––to use a word I don’t like––globalised. Pillage
has been industrialised (Fisk 2008:xiii).
The Military-Archaeology Complex
If the close collaboration of archaeologists with the military of their own
country engaged in the invasion and occupation of Iraq had little impact
in terms of saving even the few selected archaeological sites listed, and the
buildings that had to be secured, what did it achieve? In the months and
years that followed, the links between the military and archaeological and
heritage organisations and professionals intensified. US-based archaeolo-
gists surveyed the damage to antiquities under heavy US army protection,9
and a recent survey to assess the damage in the south, carried out by
archaeologists from the British Museum in collaboration with Iraqi archae-
ologists was ‘‘facilitated by the British Army’’ (Curtis 2008:220). Archaeolo-
gists and other heritage professionals from the invading nations worked in
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the cultural sections of the ‘‘Coalition Provisional Authority’’ set up by the
military occupiers (cf. Curtis 2003), and the Archaeological Institute of
America has sent archaeologists to US military bases and camps to ‘‘teach
the basics of Middle Eastern archaeology and the importance of protecting
the evidence of past cultures’’ (Waldbaum 2005; cf. also Geracimos 2008).
US military officers now write for or have been interviewed by scholarly
archaeological journals and volumes (e.g. Bogdanos 2005; Rose 2003), and
they function as discussants and presenters in archaeological conferences.
In one case, a then US Army officer used the academic platform of a
prominent archaeological journal to attack archaeologists who had
expressed opposition to the war in Iraq (Bogdanos 2005); this article went
unchallenged, with no commentary nor response by the editors, nor any-
one else. In another case, a UK-based team of forensic archaeologists and
anthropologists moved from an archaeology department to a department
linked directly with the ‘‘defence’’ sector, a place where ‘‘experts from Aca-
demia––Cranfield University––and Officers of the British Armed Forces
meet to teach Defence Science, Technology and Management’’10 and which
organises conferences such as ‘‘small arms and cannons’’; ‘‘electronic war-
fare’’; ‘‘military anthropology’’; but also ‘‘understanding Islam’’.11
In 2004, the Smithsonian Institution organised an exhibition of American
wars, starting with the early years of American independence, and conclud-
ing with the invasion of Iraq. Its title, ‘‘The Price of Freedom’’. Some
museum professionals thus have already inscribed the Iraq invasion, into a
narrative of wars of independence. The otherwise innovative exhibition on
Babylon which opened at the British Museum in November 2008, concluded
with a video outlining the recent legacy of the site, including the damage
done by Saddam Hussein and by the USA army (cf. Curtis 2008); the final
section of the video, however (‘‘The Future’’) ends with the reassurance that
archaeologists from the British Museum now work closely with Iraqi archae-
ologists, UNESCO, and the military, to plan the protection of the site.
In the run up to WAC6 (Dublin, 29 June–4 July 2008), I was asked, as a
co-ordinator of the task force on archaeologists and war, to organise the
theme on this issue for the conference. With fellow members of the task
force, Reinhard Bernbeck and Susan Pollock, we put together the theme
‘‘Archaeologists, War and Conflict: Politics, Ethics, Responsibility’’. When
we started receiving proposals for themes and papers from serving army offi-
cers (from the USA and UK armies), we had to reflect long and hard on
whether to accept them or not. After long deliberations, we decided not to
accept offers by serving military of any country, stating that this is an oppor-
tunity for archaeologists to debate their ethical and political stance in situa-
tions of warfare, not a general conference theme on war. Furthermore, that
the presence of serving military personnel from armies that are currently
engaging in imperial pre-emptive wars was not only against the spirit of the
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theme, but it could also cause offence and intimidation to several colleagues,
especially from the countries currently being invaded. As a result of this
decision, we came under extensive pressure by WAC and the organisers to
change our mind. At the end, serving army officers participated in sessions
outside the ‘‘Archaeologists and War’’ theme. One such session had to take
place under police guard (for reasons still unclear), causing further intimida-
tion to several delegates who refused to attend the session in protest. In early
2008, I was invited to attend an academic conference at Cambridge, UK, on
war and cultural heritage, to be held at the end of that year. I accepted, but
when later in that year I received the final list of speakers, the name of a UK
army general, at the time in charge of the UK army forces in Iraq, had been
added. After long and hard thinking I withdraw from the conference, and so
did two other colleagues for the same reasons.
It seems that it is now becoming acceptable for serving military person-
nel to be invited to academic conferences, as if the military is another
‘‘stakeholder’’, which shares the ethics and values of scholarly work, as well
as the concern of academics and heritage professionals for the care and
protection of cultural heritage; as if it was, in other words, a natural part-
ner in our efforts to rescue antiquities. Even if the military in which these
officers are prominent members of is at the same time implicated in illegal
wars and occupations, they implement a neo-imperial project, and have
been found guilty of torture and other crimes. Within any military, of
course, there are different views and perceptions on culture and cultural
heritage (cf. Brown 2008), but the traditions, principles and structures of
such organisation are antithetical to the spirit of critique, debate, and chal-
lenge of authority which should characterise intellectual work. More
importantly, contemporary warfare cannot be dissociated from the political
projects which is called to serve.
In the flurry of academic publications that followed the Iraq disaster,
the looting and destruction of cultural heritage is seen mostly as a problem
of bad communication, of mismanagement, of lack of information among
the military. As can be seen from the second passage at the top of this arti-
cle, archaeologists are now willing to offer professional, technical cultural
advice and expertise on the next ‘‘nation to be occupied’’, accepting uncrit-
ically and as a-matter-of-fact that this will be the course of events form
now on, as the naturalised state of world affairs. Hence all the initiatives to
inform and train the military, and to collaborate even closer with it.
The archaeological outrage following the 2003 looting and destruction
can be seen, to some extent, not only as a professional reaction in favour
of antiquities, but also as another expression of the anti-war sentiment,
especially in the rare occasions when it was articulated as part of a holistic,
ethical, political as well as professional response. As such, it was extremely
valuable (cf. Mirzoeff 2008:119). But for the most part, this outrage was
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abstract and depoliticised, it was an outrage that focused mostly on ancient
objects, one that construed a terrain full of world masterpieces and invalu-
able sites, but deplete of contemporary people, a terra nullius, well known
from the colonial discourse. It also failed to see the broader political con-
text and the attempt to undo a country. This depoliticised reaction, and
the collaboration of archaeologists with the military (assisted by the ‘‘cul-
tural turn’’ in the military itself),12 may not have succeeded to safeguard
Iraq’s cultural heritage, but they did achieve something important, with
potentially serious consequences. They set the foundations, un-intentionally
perhaps, for a new militarised archaeology, a military-archaeology com-
plex.13 I argue that this military-archaeology complex, some expressions of
which I have outlined above, deserves serious study, and its ethical and
political dimensions should be examined in much detail. It constitutes a
new area for the politics of archaeology, but one that chances are, will be
increasingly important in the future.
The phenomenon is not simply a sideline in the broader archaeological
discussion. It is rather linked directly to the definition and ontology of
archaeology, its ethics (what is our primary ethical responsibility?), and its
politics (what are the political effects of our action?) As noted earlier,
recent and very promising discussions on the ontology of the discipline,
define archaeology broadly as the study of all material culture, be it prehis-
toric or contemporary, a monumental building or a humble house, and
their broader landscape. Such definition seems to be at odds with the
interventions by archaeologists who rushed to provide expertise to the mil-
itary, compile lists of ‘‘important’’ sites and so on. Moreover, the collabo-
ration of archaeologists with the military rests on the assumption that the
most important ethical principle for the archaeologist, her primary duty
and responsibility, is the stewardship for and protection of the ‘‘archaeo-
logical record’’, however defined. The hugely problematic nature of such
assumption and its ethical traps have been widely debated (cf. Groarke and
Warrick 2006; Hamilakis 1999; 2007; Tarlow 2006; Wylie 2005, and other
papers in the same volume). Increasingly, it is becoming accepted that
archaeologists do not deal with the material traces of dead people, but
rather with living people and ‘‘living’’ things, engaged in the endless pro-
cess of mutual constitution. To selectively valorise certain things which
have been constituted by archaeologists as ‘‘archaeological record’’ (Meso-
potamian palaces or cities, for example) and to declare ourselves as the
stewards of such a record, is not only ontologically unsustainable but also
ethically suspect and self-serving. Our ethical responsibility should not be
towards an abstract sense of the past nor towards one materialised by
archaeologists themselves, a past which we are supposed to safeguard for
an equally abstract future, evading thus the present. It should rather be
towards the social present, a present which incorporates the animate and
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inanimate beings of multiple, and often co-existing times, and towards an
ethically conceived and socially just future.
It is partly this sense of misplaced professionalised responsibility to a
very selective and archaeologically produced ‘‘record’’ that justifies alliances
such as with the military, even if that military is engaged in destroying at
the same time the very material heritage that archaeologists claim to pro-
tect. But this sense of responsibility is not only misplaced and arbitrary, it
is also metaphysically abstract and completely depoliticised: it does not rec-
ognise the broader political frameworks within which it becomes impli-
cated, nor the political effects of actions such as the collaboration with a
military engaged in neo-colonial invasions and occupations. A militarised
archaeology, especially when its agents become fully embedded within mili-
tary structures (as employees or advisors of the military, for example), does
not loose simply its autonomy and independence, and thus its ability to
critique military and political authority; it also provides scholarly and aca-
demic legitimacy to military campaigns and the political projects they
serve. The military thus becomes sanitized and depoliticized, an innocent
bystander, absolved of the responsibility borne by its political masters, a
‘‘service industry’’, ‘‘armed social work’’ (cf. Gregory 2008:13), with a ‘‘job
to do’’ (a ‘‘war to run’’––Stone 2005:4). The willingness of some parts of
the military to make ‘‘rescuing antiquities’’ part of their business, to set up
an archaeology branch in their midst, invests their operations with respect-
ability and cultural sensitivity, a respectability and legitimacy that in the
case if Iraq, were and are badly needed. It also acts therapeutically for
domestic audiences in the invading countries (Gregory 2008), offering a
positive picture amidst the string of bad news. Finally, in the case of Iraq,
it offers an assurance that the USA and UK administrations and their mili-
tary will avoid a PR disaster, such as the public outrage after the looting of
the Iraq Museum in Baghdad, ‘‘next time’’.
There are additional ethical concerns and conundrums that a militarised
archaeology is bound to face. For example, how legitimate is it for archae-
ologists from the invading nations to be collaborating with the military of
their own countries, especially since some of these countries (as in the case
of the UK), have a long history of colonial rule and domination, and of
colonial archaeology, in the countries that they illegally invaded? Why was
there almost no discussion on the potential links between these old colo-
nial ties and the current campaigns, and on the nationalist anxieties to
stake claims in the post-invasion Iraq? And what kind of image of archae-
ology do these specialists project on the people of the invaded country,
when they tour the country carrying out their archaeological work under
the heavy armed protection of the occupying army, an army and an occu-
pation hugely unpopular in that country, as in the case of Iraq?
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Doing Nothing?
A counter-argument to the objections raised above is that this position
implies inactivity, passivity, withdrawal, which, some claim, is worse and
more unethical. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, most spe-
cialists who have pointed out the ethical pitfalls of a militarised archaeology
have been very active over Iraq, and more generally. They have often com-
bined their archaeological persona with that of the activist, being very vocal
and explicit in their opposition to the invasion and its ideological and politi-
cal basis, pointing at the same time to the disastrous effects of such action
for archaeological heritage (e.g. Bernbeck 2008b). My position here does not
advocate inactivity and non-engagement; in fact, it advocates the opposite.
In cases like Iraq, archaeologists who, of course, possess other identities too,
such as that of the concerned citizen, the national subject of an invading
country, or the public intellectual, could have expressed their public opposi-
tion to the invasion on various grounds (and some have done so): political,
ethical, as well as specifically professional. In addition, they could have used
their specialist knowledge and skills to expose the colonial underpinnings of
such campaign, deconstruct the ‘‘civilising’’ discourse of the invader, and
show the historical links with earlier forms of imperial domination. The raw
material for this deconstructionist project is plentiful: from the invocation of
the figure of T.E. Lawrence and the constant citation of his work in the vari-
ous ‘‘cultural’’ initiatives of the USA military (Gregory 2008:17–18; Gonza´lez
2007), to the construction and dissemination of allochronic stereotypes, such
as the discursive and visual theme, popular at the start of the invasion of
Afghanistan, which portrayed its people as living in the ‘‘Bronze Age’’. They
could have also projected a broad and inclusive definition of the archaeolog-
ical and material heritage, pointing to the futility of any exercise in selective
prioritisation and listing in the midst of a military attack of overwhelming
force, and of the dangers of separating people and things.
Other expressions of more practical intervention could include the soli-
darity and direct collaboration (outside of the military structures) with
archaeologists working in the occupied countries, the invitation to them to
talk about the archaeology of their country as they define it or about archae-
ology in general, or even ask them to train students in western countries.
Archaeologists could also campaign for the return to Iraq of the masses of
documents of historical value which were illegally seized by the USA military
and by intelligence forces and are currently kept in USA institutions.14 And
finally, they could campaign for cultural reparations towards the invaded
countries (which will also imply acceptance of responsibility), rather than
‘‘aid’’ by the invaders, linked to specific political agendas, such as the creation
of a, friendly towards the donor, cultural elite, as it happens at the moment.15
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In some cases, archaeologists and others may of course have no option
but to liaise with military authorities, and nobody has suggested that this
should be avoided at all costs. But such engagement should always happen
openly and publicly rather than in secrecy, and should not sacrifice the
independence and autonomy of the scholar, and her ability to resist the
physical and structural violence of the military (Bernbeck 2008a). It should
include the open critique of illegal military action, whether it is to do with
humanitarian crimes, or with iconoclastic campaigns (Bernbeck 2008b),
and the symbolic and material use of ancient sites as their bases (cf. Bahra-
ni 2006). Moreover, any engagement should be constantly aware of its
legitimating effects, and its deployment within broader regimes of truth
and rule (Foucault 1980), whether it is the use of mass exhumations to jus-
tify the violent removal of a regime, or the deployment by a military of the
discourse of care and protection of ancient sites (‘‘military stewardship’’)
to demonstrate cultural sensitivity.
One of outcomes of the Iraq affair is the current attempts to create a new
umbrella organisation that will co-ordinate the response of heritage profes-
sionals in situations of natural and human-made disasters, such as wars. The
International Committee of the Blue Shield, the symbol for marking cultural
sites specified by the Hague convention, is seen as one such organisation by
many. One of the key stated aims of this international committee is its inde-
pendence and neutrality, hence the statement that it is equivalent to the
International Committee of the Red Cross.16 Many heritage professionals
who champion the Blue Shield, however, have already compromised the
independence of their organisations and their own, by collaborating with the
invading armies of their own countries, engaging in an illegal war. Besides, in
the website of the USA branch of this committee, the word independence is
nowhere to be seen, whereas its first goal is to: ‘‘coordinate with the US mili-
tary, US government, and other cultural property organizations to protect
cultural property worldwide during armed conflict’’.17 Note the phrasing
here: both the US government and the US military become partners in the
protection of ‘‘cultural property’’, and if one wanted to read this passage lit-
erally, they even become ‘‘cultural property organisations’’ themselves. Set-
ting up such an organisation is not an easy task, nor am I the best person to
prescribe a plan for it, but for any such organisation to succeed, autonomy,
independence, freedom from censorship and self-censorship, and ability to
publicly critique power structures are paramount. This is what embedded
archaeologists and heritage professionals, often working in secret, have lost;
they have surrendered their autonomy as scholars, as intellectuals, as citizens
who can use their specialist knowledge, not only to care for the material heri-
tage, but also to articulate a powerful, public, critical response. They have
become professionalized technicians who do not question the broader regime
of truth and power within which their knowledge is being deployed.
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One of most encouraging signs, however, is the overt or covert expres-
sions of resistance or concern. Several colleagues who were approached by
the army in 2003 in the USA and the UK, declined to collaborate; and sev-
eral Mesopotamian specialists expressed their public opposition to the
invasion primarily on humanitarian and ethical, as well as scholarly
grounds. But even people who have accepted that role, have started having
serious doubts on the wisdom of their decision. Here are just two exam-
ples. Rene Teijgeler, held the position of senior advisor for the Ministry of
Culture at the so-called Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office, at the
US Embassy. But in a recent article (Teijgeler 2008) he openly compared
the roles of embedded archaeologist to that of the embedded journalist,
producing biased news, and worse, becoming part of the war machine. He
concludes by saying that we need to examine that role much more care-
fully. Zainab Bahrani, despite her doubts, due to her strong opposition to
the war, travelled to Iraq in 2004 and acted as an advisor to the Iraqi Min-
ister of Culture. ‘‘At that time, [she will write] the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) had handed ‘full authority’ of the ministry back to Iraq
and to the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH), but the truth
was that this was merely a charade’’ (Bahrani 2008b:165). After many frus-
trating months trying to convince the USA army and its allies (including
the embedded archaeologists working on site) to stop occupying Babylon,
with the army claiming that in that way they were protecting it from loot-
ers, she gave up, and she concludes her recent article by saying:
For me, the battle for Babylon, is a metaphor for the occupation of Iraq. The
idea that the USA took Babylon for its own protection is perhaps similar to
the idea that the USA invaded Iraq to bring it freedom. If you believe in the
second statement, you are likely to believe the first (Bahrani 2008b:170).
Bahrani has made it clear (pers. comm.) that based on the experience on
Iraq she would refuse any request for collaboration by any military or gov-
ernmental organisation in the future.
Conclusion
More often than not, the archaeological involvement with the military as
part of the recent, US-led invasions has been framed as a simple narrative
of a moral crusade to rescue antiquities, amidst the ferocious and cata-
strophic warfare. I have tried to show here that this narrative is far too
simplistic and misleading. I have instead tried to tease out some of the
complexities of the situation, to show links and associations, and more
importantly to situate this archaeological involvement within its disciplin-
ary, social and political context. History, as well as politics has been absent
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from this discussion. While a full historical analysis of the phenomenon
was beyond the scope of this paper, I intimated that the invocation of 18th
and 19th century colonial archaeology which was an integral part of mili-
tary campaigns, especially in the Middle East, maybe a useful thought
experiment while we contemplate the current phenomenon. The similari-
ties do not stop in geography either, nor in the colonial overtones of the
recent invasions. For example, while the involvement of archaeologists and
anthropologists with the military and with intelligence services in the Sec-
ond Wold War and during the Cold War was mostly covert (Price 2008),
and often resulted in widespread condemnation within the scholarly com-
munity, the earlier involvement, like the contemporary one, was more
explicit and overt, and it had become a naturalised state of affairs, much
like the current phenomenon I have traced here.
I do not, of course, underestimate the significant historical and social dif-
ferences, nor do I wish to push the historical analogy too far. That is why in
my analysis I have placed more emphasis on the current historical and politi-
cal context rather than on the 18th and 19th century one. In 2003, I claimed
that the archaeological involvement during and after the Iraq invasion throws
archaeology into a serious ethical crisis, exposing the dangers of a de-politi-
cised, professionalized archaeology and of the fetishisation of a narrowly
defined archaeological record.18 Five years later, and with the benefit of a sig-
nificant body of new data, the widespread exposure of the political agenda of
the invasion, and some succinct and sharp analysis, in several disciplines, of
the cultural dimensions of that invasion, we can trace more clearly the fea-
tures of this crisis, and start analysing its emerging characteristics.
I have claimed here that the close collaboration of archaeologists and
other heritage professional with the USA and UK invading military since
2003, and the ‘‘cultural turn’’ within the military itself, have resulted in an
emerging military-archaeology complex which deservers further scrutiny.
Within this phenomenon, the archaeologist or heritage specialist emerges
as a de-politicised, seemingly ‘‘neutral’’ professional who offers advice and
expertise to the military of their own country engaging in often illegal
invasions, and being, more often than not, oblivious to the overtly or cov-
ertly political deployments of that knowledge and expertise. The main ethi-
cal responsibility of that professional seem to be towards the archaeological
material past, defined very narrowly to include only the conventional
archaeological sites and objects (with Mesopotamian antiquities occupying
a prominent position), and not the objects and things of all periods,
including the contemporary era, in other words the entirety of the material
culture, with which people construct associations and which was destroyed
on a mass scale by the invading armies. While several western archaeolo-
gists have embarked on admirable attempts to establish links and collabo-
rations with some archaeologists from the occupied countries, in their
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chosen sense of professional responsibility contemporary people from these
countries are largely absent, and the link between people and things sev-
ered. Moreover, this military-archaeology complex contributes to the de-
politicisation of warfare, its naturalisation, even its re-branding as an agent
of cultural preservation, a role that the military is keen to promote further.
I have also claimed that the need to maintain our position of autonomy
and independence from the military does not imply inactivity, and ‘‘doing
nothing’’. I have instead shown that in fact scholars who oppose the cur-
rent invasions and the close involvement of archaeology with the invading
armies can (and often do) engage in meaningful and effective action, from
articulating a powerful professional-cum-political response, to deconstruct-
ing the discourse and the historical roots of the current invasions, to col-
laborating with archaeologists from the occupied countries outside the
military structures, and to fighting for cultural reparations.
I do not claim to have solved all ethical conundrums and dilemmas,
nor do I want to foreclose further debate on this difficult and important
issue. I claim neither the high moral ground nor the monopoly of truth on
this matter, and as it should have become clear to the reader, especially the
one who is familiar with my earlier writings on the issue, my positions
here incorporate insights from colleagues and opponents in endless
debates, and are the outcome of much rethinking and hard and agonising
reflection. And while there may be serious disagreements on the various
ethical dilemmas at play, at the end of the day there is perhaps a position
that many of us would agree with, although we may continue to disagree
on how to achieve it: that we should be true advocates for heritage by car-
ing for and defending strongly and passionately human lives and cultural
objects alike, past and present, being at the same time independent, and
strong opponents of those who try to obliterate them. And that we should
avoid becoming the cultural branch of war machines, the narrowly defined
heritage professionals of the next, bloody neo-colonial project.
Postscript
After, extensive debate, the delegates of 6th World Archaeological Congress
adopted the following resolution, which had been signed by more than 100
delegates:
The 6th World Archaeological Congress expresses its strong opposition to
any unilateral and unprovoked, covert or overt military action (including air
strikes) against Iran by the US government, or by any other government.
Such action will have catastrophic consequences for millions of people and
will seriously endanger the cultural heritage of Iran and of the Middle East
The ‘‘War on Terror’’ and the Military–Archaeology Complex
in general. Any differences with Iran (as with any other country) should be
resolved through peaceful and diplomatic means.
The Congress also urges its members, all archaeologists and heritage profes-
sionals to resist any attempts by the military and governments to be co-opted
in any planned military operation, for example by providing advice and
expertise to the military on archaeological and cultural heritage matters. Such
advice would provide cultural credibility and respectability to the military
action. Archaeologists should continue emphasising instead the detrimental
consequences of such actions for the people and the heritage of the area, for
the past and the present alike. A universal refusal by archaeologists and oth-
ers would send the message that such a plan is hugely unpopular amongst
cultural professionals as well as the wider public.
The Executive of the World Archaeological Congress considered this resolu-
tion and issued the following media release (www.worldarchaeological
congress.org; accessed 12 November 2008).
Cultural Heritage in Iran under Threat
The World Archaeological Congress expresses its strong opposition to
aggressive military action (including air strikes) against Iran by the US
government, or by any other government.
‘‘Such action could have catastrophic consequences for millions of peo-
ple and will seriously endanger the cultural heritage of Iran and of the
Middle East in general,’’ said Professor Claire Smith, President of the
World Archaeological Congress.
‘‘The Iraq war was a disaster for cultural heritage in this region. The
world can not afford to replicate mistakes such as this.’’
‘‘The World Archaeological Congress strongly opposed the war in Iraq,
and we strongly oppose any war in Iran,’’ said Professor Smith.
‘‘War destroys both lives and cultural heritage. Any differences with Iran
(as with any other country) should be resolved through peaceful and diplo-
matic means.’’
‘‘There was a lot of debate around the issue of whether archaeologists
should provide advise and expertise to the military on archaeological and
cultural heritage matters,’’ said Professor Smith.
‘‘There is a strong view by some members that a refusal by archaeolo-
gists and others to work with the military would send a message that war
with Iran is hugely unpopular amongst cultural heritage professionals,’’
said Professor Smith. ‘‘The view here is that providing advise and expertise
to the military during the war planning against Iran would offer cultural
credibility and respectability to the military action.’’
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‘‘Other members take the opposite stance, that it is their responsibility
as cultural heritage specialists to attempt to mitigate the damage done to
cultural heritage wherever there is conflict as this cultural heritage could be
an essential building block in the peace process,’’ said Professor Smith.
A resolution suggesting that no archaeologists or cultural heritage spe-
cialists assist the military in planning to protect the cultural heritage was
passed by the Plenary session of the WAC-6 Congress for consideration by
the World Archaeological Congress Assembly, Council and Executive but
was not approved as a formal statement of the position of the organisation
as a whole.
‘‘This debate highlights how strongly people feel about any impeding
military engagement with Iran,’’ said Professor Smith.
Since 2003 the World Archaeological Congress has had a Task Force on
Archaeologists and War with an explicit remit to investigate the ethics
implications of working with the military.
In order to address these issues from a global perspective the World
Archaeological Congress will be holding an Inter-Congress with the theme
‘‘Archaeologists, Ethics and Armed Conflict.’’ This is likely to be held in
the Hague in 2010’’.
The text of the original resolution, despite the calls, had not, at the time
of writing, appeared on the website of the organisation.
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Notes
1. For the full text of the letter and its context, see Hamilakis 2003.
2. There were some exceptions, of course: for example, the petition signed by 78 Mesopo-
tamian specialists opposing the Iraq invasion on ethical and humanitarian grounds (see
The Archaeological Record 3 (1), January 2003); the small group that was formed in the
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UK under the title ‘‘Archaeologists against the war’’ which also participated in the big
anti-war rallies in London UK, in early 2003; and some recent archaeological writings
which deconstruct the rhetoric of the US military in Iraq, especially its rendering of
Iraq as ‘‘Indian country’’ (Silliman 2008), or problematise the ethics of archaeological
work in warfare more generally (cf. the special issue of this journal––vol. 4 (3), 2008––
edited by Reinhard Bernbeck, Susan Pollock and Maria Theresia Starzmann). Other
exceptions are discussed below.
3. As the USA’s General H. Petraeus put it in a recent interview, ‘‘while ‘military action is
absolutely necessary’, other resources are required to gain the advantage and ‘capitalise
on gains in the security arena’’ (Geracimos 2008).
4. The most comprehensive database of newspaper articles on the issue, covering the per-
iod between March 2003 and May 2006, is still the one set up by Francis Deblauw
(http://iwa.univie.ac.at/iraqarchive1.html; accessed 12 November 2008). In more recent
years, a number of edited volumes and exhibition catalogues has also appeared, such as
Foster et al. 2005; Emberling and Hanson 2008; Rothfield 2008; Stone and Farchakh
Bajjaly 2008. See also the volume by Khaled Nashef (2004), in Arabic (I owe this infor-
mation, and the translation of the title, to Zainab Bahrani).
5. E.g. Stone (2005:3) mentions a ‘‘selective list of 36 of the most important sites, ranging
from Neanderthal to Islamic’’.
6. Bahrani Z. 2003. Video at the Columbia University Website (http://www.columbia.edu/
cu/news/vforum/02/access_of_evil/index.html; accessed 12 November 2008).
7. According to data gathered by Opinion Research Business (ORB) (http://www.opinion.
co.uk/Newsroom_details.aspx?NewsId=88; accessed November 2008).
8. Oxfam and the Coordination Committee in Iraq, 2007, Rising to the Humanitarian
Challenge in Iraq (http://web.mit.edu/humancostiraq/reports/oxfam_iraq.pdf; accessed
12 November 2008).
9. E.g. the survey carried out in the summer of 2003 and funded by National Geographic,
which documented the extent of the looting, but also established that most declared
and known archaeological sites were not directly hit during the bombing, probing one
of the members of the team, Henry Wright, to state in a interview ‘‘Somebody in the
US government deserves positive credit for sparing the archaeological sites from bomb-
ing’’ (Vedantam 2003).
10. http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/dcmt/index.jsp; accessed 19 November 2008.
11. http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/dcmt/symposia/list%20of%20events/page11224.jsp; accessed
27 June and 12 November 2008.
12. A recent expression of this ‘‘cultural turn’’ is the Minerva Consortia Project, launched by
the USA Department of Defence. The then (and current) Secretary of Defence Robert M.
Gates, in his speech to the Association of American Universities in Washington DC on
April 14 2008, outlined the philosophy of this programme, which plans to fund from the
Department’s budget a range of research projects (including one on Iraq) in the humani-
ties and social sciences, and, following the experience of ‘‘game theory and Kremlinology,
two fields developed during the Cold War’’, to ‘‘engage additional intellectual disci-
plines––such as history, anthropology, sociology and evolutionist psychology’’ (http://
www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1228; accessed 12 November 2008);
for a range of critical responses to this programme, see http://www.ssrc.org/
essays/minerva/; accessed 18 November 2008.
13. Space limitations do not allow discussion of the most blatant aspects of this recent
militarised archaeology, which I am sure they are met with universal condemnation,
including from the specialists I have critiqued here: for example, Al-Hussainy and
Matthews (2008:96) refer to ‘‘archaeologists working with occupation troops without
the legal authority of the Iraqi State Board. In April 2006 the Italian epigraphist
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G. Pettinato announced the find of 500 cuneiform texts at the famous site of Ur…We
still do not know what was really found at Ur in spring 2006 but we do know that
whatever it was, it was illegally found as no permit was issued from the State Board’’.
It is worth comparing the case of archaeology with that of anthropology: critiques
have recently argued that initiatives such as the Pentagon’s Human Terrain Pro-
gramme, that is the employment of anthropologists by the US army (uniformed, and
armed in some cases) in order to ‘‘study’’ local people in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well
as other initiatives lead to the ‘‘weaponisation’’ of anthropology (Gonza´lez 2007,
2008). The American Anthropological Association (AAA) has voiced its strong objec-
tion to these initiatives. See news and commentary in the AAA’s Anthropology News,
and the site of the Network of Concerned Anthropologists (http://concerned.
anthropologists.googlepages.com/; accessed 12 November 2008). This is a much more
direct and more blatant militarization of a discipline, than the archaeological case.
14. See the passionate article by Saad Eskander, director of the Iraq National Library and
Archives, who has been campaigning for this cause for some time now (http://www.
ssrc.org/essays/minerva/2008/10/29/eskander/#_ftn1; accessed 19 Nobember 2008).
15. Elsewhere (Hamilakis 2004:96–97), I discuss briefly the substantial financial support
made by USAID towards USA universities in order to, amongst other things, train
Iraqi students in archaeology, an aid that, as was explicitly stated, aimed at ‘‘strength-
ening pro-democracy elements and pro-US teaching allies in Iraq’’.
16. http://www.ifla.org/VI/4/admin/protect.htm; accessed 12 November 2008; also http://
www.ifla.org/VI/4/admin/nc-req.htm; accessed 18 November 2008. On some thought-
ful discussion comparing the work of humanitarian organisations and that of archae-
ologies in situations of warfare, see Bernbeck 2008b.
17. http://www.uscbs.org/about_us.htm; accessed 18 November 2008.
18. See Hamilakis 2003.
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